

**SOFIA CORREA**  
<http://www.sofiacorrea.com>  
scorrea@nyu.edu

## NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Address 19 West Fourth St., 6<sup>th</sup> Floor  
New York, NY 10012-1119  
Phone +1 347-856-3632

Placement Director: David Cesarini david.cesarini@nyu.edu 212-998-3773 (office)  
646-413-8576 (cell)  
Graduate Administrator: Ian Johnson ian.johnson@nyu.edu 212-998-8901

### **Education**

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2014-2021 (expected)  
Thesis Title: *Essays in Political Activism and Social Interactions*  
MA in Economics, University of Chile, 2011-2012  
BA in Economics, University of Chile, 2006-2010

### **References**

Professor Debraj Ray  
19 West Fourth St., 6<sup>th</sup> Floor  
New York, NY 10012-1119  
212-998-0000 (office)  
debraj.ray@nyu.edu

Professor Ennio Stacchetti  
19 West Fourth St., 6<sup>th</sup> Floor  
New York, NY 10012-1119  
212-998-0000 (office)  
ennio.stacchetti@nyu.edu

Professor Alessandro Lizzeri  
Princeton University, Department of  
Economics  
Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building  
Princeton, NJ 08544  
lizzeri@princeton.edu

### **Teaching and Research Fields**

Microeconomics, Political Economy and Economic Theory

### **Teaching Experience**

Fall 2020	Microeconomics with Algebra, NYU Stern, TA for Prof. Luis Cabral
Summer 2019	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lecturer
Fall 2018	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Prof. Ennio Stacchetti
Summer 2018	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lecturer
Fall 2017	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Prof. Mikhail Panov
Spring 2017	Statistics, NYU, TA for Prof. Anthony Donoghue

### **Research Experience and Other Employment**

2019-2020 Research Assistant for Prof. Debraj Ray

## **Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships**

2014-2020 Henry McCracken Fellowship, PhD studies, NYU  
2011-2012 National Master's Scholarship, CONICYT, Government of Chile

## **Professional Activities**

### **Conferences and Seminars**

2020 Young Economists' Symposium (U Penn); Theory Reading Group (Boston University); Micro Theory Lunch (NYU)  
**Upcoming:** Development Seminar (NYU)  
2019 Micro Theory Lunch (NYU)  
2017 SAET Conference (Faro, Portugal); Economics Seminar (University of Chile)  
2014 Game Theory Society Conference, IWGTS (Sao Paulo, Brasil)  
2013 Chilean Economics Society Conference (Santiago, Chile)  
2012 Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society (Lima, Peru), IMCA (Lima, Peru), Chilean Economics Society Conference (Viña del Mar, Chile), Economics Seminar (University of Vigo, Spain)

### **Coordination Activities**

2017-2019 Student Micro Theory Lunch, NYU

### **Professional Employment**

2012-2014 Economist, Chilean Antitrust Agency

## **Publications**

Correa, Sofia and Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo (2014), "Essential Equilibria of Large Generalized Games," *Economic Theory*, 57(3), 479-513.

## **Research Papers**

### *Persistent Protests* (Job Market Paper)

A continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs participate in a public protest, with well-defined demands. The government can concede at any time. As long as it does not, it shoulders a cost that is increasing in time and in participation rates. Apart from their collective demands, citizens enjoy a "merit reward" if the government concedes while they are actively participating. A protest equilibrium of the ensuing dynamic game must display: (a) a *build-up stage* during which citizens continuously join the protest, but the government ignores them, followed by (b) a *peak* at which the government concedes with some positive probability, failing which there is (c) a protracted *decay stage*, in which the government concedes with some density, and citizens continuously drop out. Citizens with higher opportunity costs enter later and exit earlier. While there are multiple equilibria, every equilibrium with protest has the above properties, and the set of all equilibria is fully described by a single pseudo-parameter, the protest peak time, which can vary within bounds that I characterize. Preliminary evidence from the *Black Lives Matter* movement supports the features that I extract from this model.

### *An Economic Theory of Segregation* (with Daniel Hojman)

This paper proposes a theory of segregation measurement based on the intensity and social diversity of pairwise interactions. In our framework societies are described by a space of locations and social groups, and a distribution of agents across locations and groups. Locations can be schools in a district, residences in a

city or platforms such media outlets, where individuals interact. Social groups can be defined by race, socioeconomic status, political ideology, or any other social identity. We axiomatize measures that can be expressed as a weighted sum across pairs of an interaction intensity that depends on locations and value of pairwise interactions that depends on social identities. We prove that the index is proportional to a correlation between spatial and social distances. The framework is illustrated with two applications. The first one measures socioeconomic segregation in Chilean schools, showing variation across cities and grades. The second one measures ideological segregation in the consumption of media outlets, for different media platforms -newspapers, radio, TV- for 27 European countries, finding systematic differences in segregation across countries and platforms.